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SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK
COUNTY OF DUTCHESS
Present:
Hon. Maria G. Rosa
Justice

In the Matter of the Application of
LAMONT KINARD, - 93A0552,
Petitioner,
For a Judgment Pursuant to Article 78 of the
Civil Practice Laws and Rules

DECISION, ORDER AND
JUDGMENT
Index No. 2174/17

-againstNEW YORK STATE BOARD OF PAROLE,
Respondent.

The following papers were read and considered on this Article 78 petition:
ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE
PETITION
EXHIBITS 1 - 2
ANSWER AND RETURN
EXHIBITS 1 - 12
REPLY
Petitioner brought this proceeding pursuant to CPLR Article 78 to review a determination
of the Board of Parole denying his request for parole release. Petitioner was convicted in 1993 after
pleading guilty to manslaughter in the first degree and two counts of assault in the first degree. He
was sentenced to an aggregate indeterminate term of fourteen to forty years. The offenses stemmed
from a 1991 incident when petitioner, who was 17 years old at the time, got into a dispute with three
other teenage boys while walking to school. Petitioner ultimately fired a semiautomatic pistol at the
boys killing one and injuring the other two. Petitioner had no prior criminal history. On February
1, 2017 petitioner appeared for either his seventh or eighth appearance before the Parole Board. He
was 43 years old. He had been incarcerated for over twenty-five years, eleven years beyond the
minimum sentence imposed. In a decision dated February 6, 2017, the Board denied release and

ordered petitioner held for an additional nineteen months. Petitioner's administrative appeal was
denied and this proceeding followed.
Petitioner maintains that the Board erred in not considering his age and attendant
circumstances at the time he committed his offenses, focusing exclusively on his crimes of
conviction to the exclusion of other requisite statutory factors, failing to appropriately consider his
COMPAS assessment and improperly considered community opposition to his release.
Pursuant to Executive Law §259-i(2)(c), the New York State Board of Parole is required to
consider a number of statutory factors in determining whether an inmate should be released to parole.
See Matter of Miller v. NYS Div. of Parole, 72 AD3d 690 (2"d Dept. 2010). The parole board must
also consider whether ''there is a reasonable probability that, if such inmate is released, he will live
and remain at liberty without violating the law and that lµs release is not incompatible with the
welfare of society and will not so deprecate the seriousness of his crime as to undermine respect for
the law." 9 NYCRR 8002. l. A parole board is not required to give equal weight to each statutory
factor, nor is it required specifically to articulate every factor considered. See Matter of Huntley v.
Evans, 77 AD3d 945 (2"d Dept. 2010). It is further permitted to place a greater emphasis on the
gravity of offense committed. See Matter of Serrano v. Alexander, 70 AD3d 1099, 1100 (3rd Dept.
2010). However, in the absence of aggravating circumstances, a parole board may not deny i:elease
solely on the basis of the seriousness of the offense. Huntley v. Evans, 77 AD3d at 947; King v.
New York State Div. of Parole, 190A.D.2d423 (1 51 Dept.1993). Moreover, while the board need
not consider each guideline separately and has broad discretion to consider the importance of each
factor, the board must still consider the guidelines. Executive Law§ 259-i(2)(a). Finally, the board
must inform the inmate in writing ofthe factors and reasons for denial of parole and"[s]uch reasons
shall be given in detail and not in conclusoryterms." Executive Law §259-i(2)(a); Malone v. Evans,
83 AD3d 719 (2nd Dept. 2011). A determination by a parole board whether or not to grant parole is
discretionary, and if made in accordance with the relevant statutory factors, is not subject to judicial
review absent "a showing of irrationality bordering on impropriety." Matter of Russo v. NYS Bd.
of Parole, 50 NY2d 69, 77 (1980).
Executive Law §259-c(4) was amended in 2011 to require the board to establish new
procedures to use in making parole determinations. The statutory amendment was intended to have
parole boards focus on an applicant's rehabilitation and future rather than giving undue weight to
the crime of conviction and the inmate's pre-incarceration behavior. To assist the members of the
board in taking this approach when making parole determinations, the amendment required the
establishment of written guidelines incorporating risk and needs principles to measure an inmate's
rehabilitation and likelihood of success upon release. See Ramirez v. Evans, 118 AD3d 707 (2nd
Dept. 2014). In response, the board of parole adopted the COMPAS (Correctional Offender
Management Profiling for Alternative Sanction) assessment tool. A COMPAS assessment was
prepared in connection with petitioner's February 1, 2017 appearance before the parole board.
The Board questioned petitioner at his parole hearing about his crimes ofconviction. Within
the context of that discussion they inquired about his family life at that time, his lifestyle and his
decision to carry loaded weapon.to school. Petitioner gave a full account of the events that led to
the shootings and the juvenile mindset that he had at the time. The Board further inquired about
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petitioner's marriage ofthirteen years, a 2015 Tier II infraction, his COMPAS risk assessment which
found him at low risk for felony violence, arrest or absconding, his plans and employment prospeds
upon release, his institutional achievements and letters sent to the Parole Board on his behalf.
Petitioner became emotional when discussing his crimes of conviction, explaining that he had
matured considerably and was no longer the same 17 year old who committed those crimes. He
further expressed remorse for his actions.
The Board's two page decision denying parole referenced petitioner's efforts towards
rehabilitation, his COMPAS risk assessment, "strong release plans" and acknowledged petitioner's
growth and productive use of his time while incarcerated. The Board further noted, however, that
his record included a Tier II infraction in which he was charged with challenging the authority of a
Correction officer and that it was concerned about petitioner's ability to effectively deal with rules.
The Board also noted community opposition and opposition by the Staten Island District Attorney.
The Board ultimately concluded that discretionary release was not warranted because it would be
incompatible with the welfare of soc·iety and deprecate the serious nature of petitioner's crimes so
as to undermine respect for the law.
Petitioner claims that the Board erred as a matter of law by not considering the significance
of his youth and its attendant circumstances at the time of the commission of his crimes. The
Supreme Court has held that the Eighth Amendment's prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment
bars the imposition of a sentence of life without parole on a juvenile. See Graham v. Florida , 562
US 48 (2010); Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S.CT. 718 (2016). This prohibition requires such
consideration at a parole hearing for a person serving a life sentence for a crime committed as a
juvenile. Hawkins v. NYS DOCCS, 140 AD3d 34 (3rd Dep't 2016). Petitioner is not serving a life
sentence. For the reasons set forth in Montgomery v. Louisiana, supra, a Parole Board should
consider the significance of an inmate's youth and its attendant circumstances at the time of the
commission of a crime where such crime was committed when the inmate was a juvenile. Petitioner
fails to demonstrate in this proceeding that his Eighth Amendment rights under the United States
Constitution were violated. Such rights are not implicated here because petitioner is not serving a
life sentence. Moreover, there was ample discussion of petitioner's youth at the time he committed
the instant offenses.
However, the Board acknowledged that it reached its determination, in part, based upon
letters of community and other opposition. It was error for the Board to rely on that opposition. It
is well established that a Parole Board is not allowed to employ its own penal philosophy in making
determinations as such factor is not encompassed in Executive Law §259-i(2)(c); King v. NYS
Division of Parole, 83 NY2d 788 (1994). The content of the community opposition that the Board
references is not before this court as it was not provided as part of the respondent's answer and
return. However, the Board expressly stated that it considered community opposition as a basis for
its decision. The consideration of opposition submitted by individuals not referenced in Executive
Law 259-i(2)(c)(A) is not permitted. As members of the Parole Board are not permitted to apply
their own penal philosophy in making release determinations, the Parole Board may not deny parole
based on opposition from unknown third parties expressing their penal philosophies. Presumably,
such individuals have no first hand knowledge of facts relevant to the Parole Board unlike those
individuals expressly set forth in Executive Law §259-i(2)(c)(A). The court rejects respondent's
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contention that such consideration is authorized under Executive Law §259-i(B). That section does
not address or govern the individuals who are authorized to provide information to a Parole Board
with respect to a release application. It addresses the confidentiality of identifying information
provided to the Parole Board. As the Parole Board's determination was affected by an error oflaw,
it is
ORDERED that the petition is granted. The February 6, 2017 determination of the Parole
Board denying parole release is vacated and the matter is remanded to the Parole Board to make a
de novo determination on petitioner's request for parole release and to give ample consideration to
petitioner's positive and productive accomplishments during incarceration and to what the Board
itself called petitioner's "strong release plans." Such determination shall be made within sixty days
of the date of this decision and order.
The foregoing constitutes the decision, order and judgment of the Court.

Jq ,

Dated: January
2018
Poughkeepsie, New York
ENTER:

MARIA G. ROSA, J.S.C.

Lamont Kinard DIN 93A0552
Otisville Correctional Facility
POBoxB
• Otisville, NY 10963

Eric T. Schneiderman
Attorney General of the State of NY
One Civic Center Plaza
Poughkeepsie, NY 12601

Pursuant to CPLR §5513, an appeal as of right must be taken within thirty days after service by a
party upon the appellant of a copy of the judgment or order appealed from and written notice of its
entry, except that when the appellant has served a copy of the judgment or order and written notice
of its entry, the appeal must be taken within thirty days thereof.

